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INTRA-TEAM AND INTER-TEAM BROKERAGE
Abstract
What role does an ego’s brokerage location—within a team (intra-team) or outside the team
(inter-team)—play in the evolution of an instrumental knowledge-seeking network in terms of
both proximal (i.e., within the team) and distal (i.e., outside the team) tie formation and tie
decay? We address this question by drawing on literature about social networks, brokerage, and
teams. We use temporally separated data from 302 students embedded in 97 teams to test our
hypotheses about the impacts of intra-team and inter-team brokerage on proximal and distal
network evolution, specifically on four network changes in knowledge-seeking networks:
proximal tie formation, proximal tie decay, distal tie formation, and distal tie decay. We find that
these four changes depend on individual network brokerage location even after controlling for
personality and task characteristics. Specifically, inter-team brokers change their networks both
within and outside their teams, whereas intra-team brokers curtail their network changes. We
argue that these opposite effects occur because inter-team brokers have greater autonomy than
intra-team brokers. This study adds to the ongoing dialog about network evolution in social
network literature and to the conversations about brokerage and its location in the context of
team-based work.
Keywords: brokerage, brokerage location, network evolution, teams, knowledge-seeking
networks
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How Intra-Team and Inter-Team Brokerage Influence Network Changes in Knowledge-Seeking
Networks
Networks have been shown to significantly influence individuals, teams, and
organizations (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003). Although network studies have established that informal
social structures benefit individuals, research has tended to ignore the factors that shape their
informal networks (exceptions include Clegg, Josserand, Mehra, & Pitsis, 2016; Parise & Rollag,
2010; Parker, Halgin, & Borgatti, 2016; Sasovova, Mehra, Borgatti, & Schippers, 2010; Schulte,
Cohen, & Klein, 2012; Vissa & Bhagavatula, 2012). The prevailing view of networks is a static
one and assumes that when individuals form ties with new alters, they retain these ties and do not
decay prior ties. However, recent studies on network evolution have questioned both these
inertia-based assumptions by showing that networks do change over time (e.g., Sasovova et al.,
2010; Schulte et al., 2012) as individuals add new ties and drop prior ones. This revised and
dynamic view of networks implies that researchers may be drawing the wrong conclusions about
networks if they assume that networks are unchanging. For example, in his seminal work on
structural holes, Burt (1992) finds that brokerage is correlated with organizational position. Did
brokers get ahead, or did the promoted individuals move to brokerage positions? A dynamic
theory of networks (and appropriate research design) can pinpoint the accurate explanation.
Scholars recently began studying the important issues related to network change, and
some recent studies have focused on the antecedents as well as the consequences of such change
(e.g., Parise & Rollag, 2010; Vissa & Bhagavatula, 2012). However, our understanding of
network dynamics is limited on three different fronts. First, studies that view networks as
dynamic ignore a key organizational feature—teams—that may shape how networks change over
time. Because teams have their unique team identities and team members are more
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interdependent with each other than with outsiders, individuals’ networks inside and outside their
teams may be shaped differently (Dahlander & McFarland, 2013). This approach to the study of
networks within and outside the team is not new (e.g., Balkundi & Harrison, 2006). However,
what has been ignored in such network literature on teams is the role that teams play in shaping
one’s informal ties inside and outside the team.
In the team context, the two basic types of network changes—forming new ties and
dropping old ties—become more nuanced when both these changes can occur inside and outside
the team. For example, individuals can add ties in their own team by seeking information from
their fellow team members (proximal tie formation), or they can add ties by seeking out
information from individuals outside their team (distal tie formation). Similarly, they can cease
seeking information from their fellow team members (proximal tie decay) or from outsiders
(distal tie decay). Therefore, network change in a team context manifests in these four types.
Second, our understanding of network change is limited in explaining how prior networks
shape future networks. Over 20 years ago, Salancik (1995) urged network researchers to explain
how brokerage influences subsequent informal interactions. Since then, the focus of the field has
primarily been on how brokerage predicts the career-related outcomes of brokers (Burt, 2005,
2007; Fang et al., 2015), which ignores Salancik’s original question about how brokerage
influences network change. In this study, we seek to answer this question and to go further by
explaining how brokerage in the team context is different because individuals can be brokers
inside their teams (intra-team brokerage) by bridging disconnected team members, or they can
bridge disconnected alters outside their teams (inter-team brokerage). Previous research finds
that each type of brokerage may provide varying levels of autonomy, which is the key benefit of
brokerage (Zou & Ingram, 2013). Overall, we seek to understand how the location of brokerage
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in terms of intra-team and inter-team brokerage shapes networks inside and outside teams.
Finally, the literature on network change has been based on friendship and advice
relationships (e.g., Sasovova et al., 2010; Vissa & Bhagavatula, 2012). We extend this work by
focusing on knowledge-seeking (KS) networks for two reasons. First, on a continuum from
informal to formal relationships, friendship ties are more informal, whereas KS ties are more
formal because they are instrumental in completing tasks. Advice ties lie somewhere in the
middle on this continuum because they can provide both task-related information and social
support. However, KS ties are more informal than those relationships that are mandated by the
organization because one can go beyond the organizational chart to seek out information.
Second, KS ties are important in contemporary organizations characterized by team-based,
knowledge-intensive, dynamic task environments in which the ability to continually acquire new
task- and context-related knowledge from multiple sources is critical for success (Espinosa,
Slaughter, Kraut, & Herbsleb, 2007; Hansen, Mors, & Lovas, 2005; Hong & Gajendran, 2018).
Successful KS in such an environment would arguably require the focal person to establish links
with those who possess the required knowledge and to continually evaluate the utility of these
connections and adapt them as knowledge requirements change (Ahuja, Soda, & Zaheer, 2012;
Gray & Meister, 2004). As discussed earlier, our goal is to shed light on the role of two different
types of brokerage—intra-team and inter-team—on individuals’ network changes in terms of KS
tie formation and KS tie decay within and outside their team boundaries.
We use temporally separated data from 302 students working in 97 teams to test our
hypotheses about how brokerage location (i.e., intra-team and inter-team brokerage) shapes the
four network changes in KS networks: proximal tie formation, proximal tie decay, distal tie
formation, and distal tie decay. We find that these network changes depend on the ego’s
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brokerage location even after controlling for personality and tasks. Overall, inter-team brokers
are more likely to shape their networks, whereas intra-team brokers are more constrained. We
contribute to the ongoing dialog about network evolution in social network literature and to
conversations about brokerage and its location in the context of team-based work.
Theoretical Background
Social Network Change
The microfoundations of network change involve two forms of network changes: tie
formation and tie decay (Koka, Madhavan, & Prescott, 2006). When two strangers establish a
relationship, they form a tie. When two people who were previously tied dissolve their
relationship or reduce their interactions, the current tie decays or goes dormant (Dahlander &
McFarland, 2013). Individuals are continuously evaluating their instrumental ties and the quality
of information flowing from them, and they are thus generally aware that they are altering their
network by forming new ties or decaying existing ties (Parker et al., 2016).
However, individuals face different constraints and pressures that limit their network
changes. To develop new ties, individuals need opportunities to interact with potential new
partners. The lack of potential partners limits an ego’s ability to form new ties. Additionally,
establishing new ties involves reaching out and communicating with these new and unknown
partners, which requires both time and motivation. Decaying ties is also not easy. For example,
egos may feel comfortable with their current ties and experience structural inertia that deter tie
decay. Further, maintaining existing ties may have other advantages such as lower startup costs,
greater certainty, and higher trust (Dahlander & McFarland, 2013). Therefore, low value ties may
not be decayed even though new ties may provide better information. Despite the apparent
differences between tie formation and tie decay, the literature has rarely studied the latter
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especially in the context of teams and knowledge work (Dahlander & McFarland, 2013).
Team Boundaries and Networks
Contemporary organizations are being designed around teams that potentially shape one’s
network. Teams give their members their identity and foster interdependence among members
(Alderfer, 1971). Both of these factors amplify the value of team membership and bring greater
attention to team members. First, being part of a team triggers a sense of identity and belonging.
For example, when they are placed in a team, both team members and outsiders recognize their
team membership (Sherif & Sherif, 1969). This team identity sharpens the attention of the team
members toward each other while affecting how team members interact with outsiders. Research
has shown that greater attention is given to fellow members than to outsiders (Park, van Bavel,
Hill, Williams & Thayer, 2016).
A second important feature of being in a team is the high degree of interdependence
among team members (Van der Vegt, Emans, & Van de Vliert, 2001). Typically, team members
are bound by reward systems that recognize the team as a whole. Individuals need input from
other team members to complete their tasks (Campion, Papper, & Medsker, 1996). In this
context, individual team members’ targets and rewards are linked to and aligned with the team’s
targets and rewards, which keep the team members’ efforts aligned with the team’s efforts. The
joint targets that individuals share with other team members help them understand each other’s
aspirations, and this facilitates a stronger team identity. Overall, the task and reward
interdependence reinforce team identity. This identification also makes team members focus
more on other team members. During these task-related activities, members observe whom their
team members interact with. Members keep track of one another to ensure that everything is
running smoothly and that they are following procedures correctly (Salas, Sims, & Burke, 2005).
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Also, team members know that other members pay “close attention to what we are doing and
will tell us if our behavior is appropriate or inappropriate” (O'Reilly & Chatman, 1996, p. 161).
Team members understand and monitor each other’s behaviors, thereby curtailing potential
opportunistic actions (Barker, 1993). Therefore, compared to outsiders, team members are more
likely to be monitored by their peers. However, some team members are monitored more than
others. For example, individuals who are seen as different from the rest of the team are often
under greater scrutiny (Robinson & O’Leary-Kelly, 1998). Given the importance of team
boundaries, how do networks change, particularly in knowledge-intensive work?
Team Boundaries and Network Change
Integrating the literature on network change and team boundaries, we propose a more
nuanced approach to network changes in the context of KS networks. Recall that network change
involves tie formation and decay, whereas team boundaries suggest that network changes are
different within and outside teams. Combining the notions of tie formation/tie decay with
proximal/distal ties (i.e., within team ties vs. outside team ties) in the context of KS networks, we
propose four individual KS network evolution (KSNE) actions: (a) proximal tie formation (Panel
A in Figure 1), (b) proximal tie decay (Panel B in Figure 1), (c) distal tie formation (Panel C in
Figure 1), and (d) distal tie decay (Panel D in Figure 1). We study network change in the context
of KS ties but not knowledge-giving or knowledge-contributing ties because individuals who
must successfully complete an instrumental task need to seek new or updated knowledge. Figure
1 shows the four possible KSNE actions.
---Insert Figure 1 here--Both endogenous and exogenous factors drive social network changes (Ahuja et al.,
2012; Contractor, Wasserman, & Faust, 2006). However, the two network changes of tie
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formation and tie decay are distinct and occur for different reasons (Koka et al., 2006).
Kleinbaum (2018) points out that tie formation is based on the opportunities in which an
individual gets to interact with others, whereas tie decay is an individual choice. Empirical
studies of individual network change have incorporated both personality (e.g., big five
personality traits) and prior network characteristics (e.g., reciprocity) as predictors or control
variables (Parise & Rollag, 2010; Vissa & Bhagavatula, 2012). We focus on one of the moststudied network positions, brokerage, to investigate whether and how brokerage drives network
change. Although brokerage has been well studied in social network literature, it has primarily
been studied as an antecedent to performance. We suggest that brokerage is also an important
antecedent to network change, within and outside the team, even after controlling for exogenous
factors of personality and task characteristics (Salancik, 1995).
Brokerage and Network Change
We build on Burt’s (1992) insights about brokerage along with Gould and Fernandez’s
(1989) work that identifies different brokerage types based on group membership. Individuals
who occupy brokerage positions bridge unconnected parties. Burt (1992) defines a broker as “a
person who generates profit from being between others” and who plays on the “conflicting
demands and preference against one another and builds value from their disunion” (p. 34). Nonbrokers, or those low in brokerage positions, have alters who are connected to each other (like in
cliques). Timely access to information is one of the key benefits that brokers accrue from their
position (Burt, 1992; Clement, Shipilov, & Galunic, in press). Moreover, because of their
advantageous network positions, brokers are able to get non-overlapping and private information
from their multiple network connections. This information is also often rare at the time brokers
get access to it, and the brokers can use this private and rare information to advance their own
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agenda. However, how do individuals get information from their alters? By seeking it out with
specific questions and asking for advice and guidance—that is, they proactively seek out
knowledge and information from others. Brokerage has always been about the flow of
information from others to the broker that brokers can then selectively share with whomever they
wish. In other words, brokerage has always been about the directional flow of information and
knowledge from the alters to the ego even though it may have not been so explicitly stated in the
literature. In the context of brokerage, we bring the notion of directional flow of knowledge to
the forefront by conceptualizing the role of intra- and inter-team brokers in a KS context.
Brokers’ network positions also give them great autonomy. Whether they exercise this
autonomy for their own benefit or for the benefit of the collective has been debated (Obstfeld,
2005). However, Xiao and Tsui (2007) argue that the self-serving orientation of brokers drives
their behavior and that brokers are “fulfilling self-interest rather than accommodating social
norms and obligations” (p. 4). They also propose that brokerage involves valuing the self over
the collective. That is, brokerage is used primarily for self-gain and not for the collective good.
Despite this lack of clarity about brokers’ motivations, the benefits of brokerage flowing from
greater autonomy have been well documented. A recent meta-analysis (Fang et al., 2015) found
that brokers do get ahead. Not only does their position get them performance advantages, but
brokers also develop a reputation among others (Grippa & Gloor; 2009).
However, being a broker is complex and it makes significant cognitive demands. Brokers
consume more cognitive resources for the same key reason they get ahead: effort in “decoding
and encoding information” (Burt & Merluzzi, 2016, p. 369). Because brokers sit in between the
two unconnected alters, they receive different bits of information from different sources. Burt
and Merluzzi (2016) point out that brokers need to understand these diverse bits of information
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and then recombine them in new and acceptable ways for other alters. All this involves additional
cognitive effort that non-brokers do not have to expend. Non-brokers have alters who are
connected to each other; therefore, they share familiar information that is easier to process.
So how do the autonomy that brokers enjoy, the additional monitoring they face within
their teams, and the additional cognitive resources they expend translate into network changes
that they can initiate? For any individual and not just brokers, developing and maintaining ties
demand intensive resources and consume time, especially when these ties create a “forbidden
triad,” that is, ties among alters who are not connected to each other (Granovetter, 1973, p.
1363). Therefore, brokers’ most optimal strategy may be to avoid expanding their network
indiscriminately to maximize diverse information (Mehra, Kilduff, & Brass, 2001). They might
continually evaluate the quality of alters’ information and dissolve ties that provide redundant
information. They can then form new ties for novel information.
The above argument, however, assumes that brokers are not constrained by memberships
in social groups and can behave as autonomous agents who seek opportunities to exploit.
However, in most organizations, as in our study, individuals are embedded within teams. As
discussed above, there is a higher level of monitoring of individuals by their own team members
than by outsiders because of team identity and interdependence among team members (Sherif &
Sherif, 1969; Van der Vegt et al., 2001). This monitoring is even higher for brokers who stand
out among team members (Grippa & Gloor, 2009). As a result, brokers may be somewhat
constrained in the level of autonomy they can exercise within a team in their network change
actions. We develop these ideas more in the following section.
Brokerage Location and Team Boundaries: Intra-Team and Inter-Team Brokers
Network researchers have identified different types of brokers based on social boundaries

9

INTRA-TEAM AND INTER-TEAM BROKERAGE
(Gould & Fernandez, 1989). Given that employees can be members of a team and a larger
organization simultaneously, they can be brokers in two different places: inside the team (intrateam brokers) and outside the team (inter-team brokers). Intra-team brokers connect their own
team members who are not connected to one another. They generate value by coordinating with
other team members (Gould & Fernandez, 1989; see Figure 1). However an individual can also
have ties outside the team and, in the process, bridge two unconnected alters who are outside
their team (inter-team brokers). Inter-team brokers act as liaisons (Gould & Fernandez, 1989)
connecting different groups. Despite this, there are situations when a broker has an alter inside
the team and an alter outside the team (Gould & Fernandez, 1989). We consider this part of interteam brokerage because there is access to information outside the team. The overall advantage of
inter-team brokerage is that these brokers have access to diverse information from these different
sources. Below, we highlight the key differences between intra-team and inter-team brokerage
while recognizing the possibility that an individual can be both simultaneously.
Intra-team brokerage. We propose that when individuals bridge unconnected members
in small-group settings, alters and others tend to observe and monitor them more, offsetting the
advantage of autonomy in brokerage. As mentioned earlier, because of team identity and task
interdependence, members observe and monitor each other (Barker, 1993; Garrahan & Stewart,
1992; Sewell, 1998). Besides the overall monitoring of team members by other team members,
intra-team brokers get additional monitoring because they stand out from the rest of the team.
Because they are easily recognizable given their network position within their team, intra-team
brokers face greater scrutiny from other team members. Further, other team members may also
label them as being corrupt and self-centered and accuse them of not being team players because
of their self-serving nature (Stovel & Shaw, 2012; Xiao & Tsui, 2007). This labeling may trigger
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even further monitoring. Therefore, intra-team brokers tend to be monitored for their various
activities, including their networking activities, and may thereby become constrained in their
network change actions.
Inter-team brokerage. Inter-team brokerage is closer to the original conceptualization of
brokers as autonomous agents. Inter-team brokers have alters outside their team, and thus they
can bridge between these external alters or be the go-between for external alters and alters inside
the team. Alters outside the primary team of the inter-team broker may all belong to a single
team other than the broker’s own team, or they may belong to different teams. In contrast to
intra-team brokers, whose alters are exclusively inside the broker’s team and are thus extensively
monitored by their alters, inter-team brokers experience less monitoring, especially when the
alters are spread across different teams, partly because of a lack of interdependence between
inter-team brokers and their alters and partly because inter-team brokers interact less frequently
with outside alters. Overall, external alters of inter-team brokers have fewer opportunities to
observe and monitor the broker.
In summary, team boundaries impose constraints on intra-team brokers that inter-team
brokers do not face and therefore influence where and when brokers can exercise their free will
and where and when they are curtailed in shaping their networks. Although both intra-team and
inter-team brokers are more strongly affiliated with and focused on their own teams because of
the different constraints they face inside and outside their teams, there are variations of how they
are able to form and decay their proximal and distal ties within and outside their teams. We
explain these processes below.
Hypotheses
Intra-Team Brokerage and Proximal Tie Formation
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An intra-team broker connects team members who do not have ties to each other and can
establish a new proximal tie within the team (see Panel A in Figure 1) in two different ways.
First, the broker can add a new contact who has no connections to the broker’s prior alters. To
seek knowledge from a new contact, brokers will need to decode the information provided by
this new alter. This decoded information would then need to be translated when exchanging
information with other team members (Cross & Parker, 2004). This cognitive process is
demanding, and it occurs in the context of intense team interactions and monitoring. Thus, intrateam brokers are not likely to add new proximal alters who are unconnected to existing alters
within their team.
The second way intra-team brokers can establish within-team ties is by adding new
proximal alters who are already connected to the current alters within the broker’s team.
However, there is no additional informational benefit because the knowledge is already available
via the current contacts. Further, in such a situation, the broker will be monitored by all intrateam alters who are already tied to each other. Consequently, the broker has little incentive to
add new ties to connected alters within the team. Overall, because of cognitive burden, lack of
new information, and monitoring, an intra-team broker is not likely to add new ties within the
team. In contrast, individuals who are tied to other team members that are also tied to each other,
i.e., individuals in low intra-team brokerage positions, are monitored less by remaining team
members and can potentially gain new information by adding new ties. Thus,
H1. Individuals’ intra-team brokerage will be negatively associated with proximal KS tie
formation.
Intra-Team Brokerage and Proximal Tie Decay
Just as intra-team brokerage shapes the addition of within-team ties, it also influences
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brokers’ tendencies to decay within-team ties. Tie dissolution, or tie decay, occurs when a person
dissolves ties with erstwhile alters (see Panel B in Figure 1). Generally, dissolving ties can be
stressful; this signals that focal individuals devalue their former alters (Leary & Springer, 2001;
MacDonald & Leary, 2005). For this reason, intra-team brokers face an especially complex
situation because they are already being monitored within their teams. These brokers have alters
within their teams who are not connected to one another and are part of a “forbidden triad”
(Granovetter, 1973). To reduce stress, intra-team brokers have two options: they can hope for
network closure when the two unconnected parties within their teams eventually establish a
direct tie, or they may decay ties to one alter and thus take sides. Both of these options mean that
the brokers lose their structural advantage. Brokers really have no control over the first option
because the initiative is with the alters to seek ties with these unconnected members. In contrast,
brokers can control the second option; they can drop one of the proximal alters and take sides
with the other, thereby reducing their own stress. However, they may also lose access to diverse
information. Thus, intra-team brokers are likely to decay proximal ties in order to reduce the
additional brokerage burden that arises from additional monitoring within their teams. However,
as mentioned earlier, those in low intra-team brokerage positions do not experience cognitive
burden or the stress of being an intermediary. Further, they are part of dense networks where
members are connected to each other and there is no pressure to drop ties. In fact, for low intrateam brokers, there would be greater pressure to retain their existing ties. Thus,
H2. Individuals’ intra-team brokerage will be positively associated with proximal KS tie
decay.
The constraints that come with intra-team brokerage also limit the intra-team broker’s
networking behaviors outside the team. An intra-team broker invests a non-trivial amount of time
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and effort to coordinate and facilitate direct KS ties with unconnected team members. These
intra-team coordination actions and the pressure of being monitored substantially drain the
broker’s cognitive resources such that the intra-team broker takes the path of least resistance to
manage outside networks.
Intra-Team Brokerage and Distal Tie Formation
We suggest that intra-team brokers limit their KS actions outside their team for different
reasons. First, establishing new ties requires time and resources, especially if these ties are
outside the team (Dahlander & McFarland, 2013). Prior research has shown that individuals are
less likely to exert the effort needed to form ties with members of other units (Feld, 1981).
Second, individuals in different teams may have different values and even divergent ways of
looking at problems, so establishing ties and acquiring actionable information from them
requires extensive work (Hansen, 1999). Third, individuals may be unsure about the quality of
information distant alters might provide (Dahlander & McFarland, 2013). Facing uncertainty and
limited time and cognitive resources to expend, intra-team brokers may not form new distal KS
ties outside their teams. In contrast, individuals who are tied to other team members that are in
turn tied to each other, i.e., individuals in low intra-team brokerage positions, may have the
necessary cognitive resources to establish ties outside their teams and value the comparatively
unique information they get from these external ties. Thus, individuals who are in low intra-team
brokerage positions could access unique information by adding new ties outside the team.
Consequently, when compared to individuals who are low on intra-team brokerage, intra-team
brokers are not likely to form distal ties outside their teams. Thus,
H3. Individuals’ intra-team brokerage will be negatively associated with distal KS tie
formation.
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Intra-Team Brokerage and Distal Tie Decay
As discussed, intra-team brokers face within-team monitoring. Having limited abilities to
act on their network positions within their teams and experiencing cognitive burden by bridging
unconnected team members, their outside-team network actions may also be limited. In contrast,
low intra-team brokers have greater autonomy to make network changes outside their team.
However, distal ties do provide needed unique information. Thus, intra-team brokers need distal
ties to access unique information that will help them (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992). Considering
that the cost of establishing new ties is higher than the cost of maintaining existing ones, it is
more economical to retain established distal ties than to form new distal ties (Dahlander &
McFarland, 2013). Given that intra-team brokers have only limited residual cognitive resources
after expending them on intra-team ties, their need for unique information, and the economics of
tie maintenance, they are less likely to decay their distal ties. Low-intra team brokers also need
unique information, but they are less constrained to drop ties because they are monitored less.
Thus,
H4. Individuals’ intra-team brokerage will be negatively associated with distal KS tie
decay.
In sum, intra-team brokers are limited by their team context (not their structural
opportunities) to act opportunistically in shaping their networks inside and outside their teams.
However, inter-team brokers do not face the same monitoring as intra-team brokers. In the
following section, we hypothesize the implications of this for network changes.
Inter-team Brokerage and Proximal Tie Formation
Inter-team brokerage differs from intra-team brokerage in that the alters are unable to
monitor the inter-team broker. When brokers connect with alters who do not meet or work with
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them regularly, alters have little information to evaluate the broker. Further, when the broker’s
alters are dispersed across different teams, they are even less likely to monitor the broker. Note
that an inter-team broker is monitored more when some of the alters are in the same team
(including the broker’s own team). However, such brokers still experience a lower level of
monitoring from their alters than do intra-team brokers, who face a much higher degree of
surveillance from their alters who are all in the same team. Thus, inter-team brokerage is the
prototype that Burt (1992) proposed when discussing the greater autonomy that brokers have to
act opportunistically. In contrast, individuals low on inter-team brokerage either have very few
ties outside their team, or their external alters are connected to each other and can thus monitor
the focal individual’s opportunistic behaviors.
However, as a broker in the external network, the inter-team broker is free to act in both
socially desirable and instrumental ways. High inter-team brokers, when compared to low-interteam brokers, can act as information gatekeepers (Gould & Fernandez, 1989) who gain
information from their outside network ties and then convey it to their teams. Coming from
different parts of the external network, this information is diverse and rich. However, this
information must be translated and customized if it is to serve the focal individual and the team,
and for that, brokers need the help of their own team members. That is, the cognitive burden that
involves synthesizing diverse information remains a factor even for inter-team brokers. However,
because inter-team brokers are not under scrutiny by their teams, their greater autonomy allows
them to form new proximal ties within their teams. Thus,
H5. Individuals’ inter-team brokerage will be positively associated with proximal KS tie
formation.
Inter-Team Brokerage and Proximal Tie Decay
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Inter-team brokers are also less likely to decay within-team ties for the same reason that
they are more likely to add within-team ties. While intra-team brokers stand out within their own
teams, inter-team brokers do not because their brokerage position and attendant behaviors lie
outside their teams. As a result, inter-team brokers are considered regular team members within
their own teams. Further, if they behave opportunistically by decaying their proximal ties, they
may draw undue attention to themselves and be seen as selfish and not as team players. More
important, inter-team brokers have no reason to decay their proximal ties. Maintaining their
current proximal ties may provide the advantage of integrating external information with team
information in a more economical manner as compared to forming new proximal ties, as
discussed above. Even if inter-team brokers get some redundant information from within their
teams, the cost of maintaining existing within-team ties is relatively low. Further, their source of
unique information is based primarily outside, not inside, the team. Therefore, individuals who
are high on inter-team brokerage, unlike those in low brokerage positions outside the team, are
not likely to drop ties for social desirability and information integration reasons. Thus,
H6. Individuals’ inter-team brokerage will be negatively associated with proximal KS tie
decay.
Inter-Team Brokerage and Distal Tie Formation
Because they have access to external networks (outside the team), high inter-team brokers
can more easily form distal KS ties with nodes outside their teams than can low inter-team
brokers. These external nodes can be social isolates unconnected to the broker or to anyone in the
network. Alternatively, they can be outsiders that have their own connections but not to the
broker. Thus, in an external network, which is typically larger than a team, tie availability is not a
limitation for brokers because they have a large pool of potential alters for establishing new KS
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ties. Furthermore, inter-team brokers have the freedom to change their networks because their
alters in other teams are not monitoring their opportunistic networking behaviors. Driven by their
need for unique information from outside their teams, a higher degree of tie availability, and their
greater autonomy in the external network, individuals in such brokerage positions are likely to
form newer distal KS ties than individuals with low inter-team brokerage positions. Therefore,
H7. Individuals’ inter-team brokerage will be positively associated with distal KS tie
formation.
Inter-Team Brokerage and Distal Tie Decay
Just as inter-team brokers are out of the spotlight and can easily add ties (Herman, 1982;
Sewell, 1998), they can also decay ties, whether because of redundant information or because of
the lack of pressure to retain ties. Maintaining ties involves spending valuable time and
resources. Thus, distal KS ties that fail to provide pertinent and unique value drain time and
resources can be decayed by such brokers. By pruning redundant distal KS ties, inter-team
brokers can more fully exploit the remaining KS ties and also free up their resources to seek new
and more useful KS ties. Inter-team brokers are uniquely positioned to decay former ties in their
distal KS networks because they have greater autonomy. In contrast, alters tend to monitor
individuals with low brokerage even in external networks. By decaying ties, low-brokerage
individuals may create dissonance in their networks. Consequently, individuals with low
brokerage are under pressure to maintain and not decay their ties (Heider, 1958). Thus, interteam brokers are expected to decay more distal KS ties to free up valuable resources as compared
to individuals in low inter-team brokerage positions. Therefore,
H8. Individuals’ inter-team brokerage will be positively associated with distal KS tie
decay.
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Method
Participants and Procedures
We conducted our study at a business school of a state university in the northeast United
States. The participants were upper-level undergraduate students enrolled in two large course
sections, one offered in the United States and the other in Singapore. The two sections had the
same instructor1 and used the same syllabus. Participation was voluntary; students received extra
credit for participating in the study or by completing an alternative assignment. At the beginning
of the semester, the instructor randomly assigned students to one of 121 software-project teams,
each consisting of four or five students. Each team had to find a real-world organizational
problem for its project. The teams had to work as information technology consultants to create a
software system that addressed a specific business problem. Students had sufficient interaction
for around three months within and outside their teams so that each student could develop a KS
network. Weekly mandatory sessions were scheduled for the teams to work on their projects, and
this further facilitated the development and evolution of individual KS networks.
Data were collected in two waves. Students were surveyed using an online survey in both
waves, and the course instructor provided archival data for use as control variables. Students
completed the wave-1 survey five weeks into the semester (T1). The survey included questions
about KS and friendship networks and individual-level control variables, including selfmonitoring personality, perceived task complexity,2 and demographic variables. During the four
weeks after the wave-1 survey (T2), participants again reported their KS network. Data about
midterm feedback (on the team project) were generated between T1 and T2 and collected from

1
2

The course instructor was not an author on this paper.
Team members had enough exposure five weeks into the semester at T1, the time of wave-1 measurement, to be
able to form opinions about the complexity of the project task.
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the instructor at the end of the semester. The first survey wave had 408 participants (the response
rate was 70.22%), and the second had 399 participants (the response rate was 68.68%); 372
students completed both survey waves. In T1, there were 102 groups (84.30%) in which the
participation rate was equal to or higher than 50%; in T2, there were 98 groups (80.93%) in
which the participation rate was equal to or higher than 50%. We first excluded 33 respondents
who completed less than 70% of survey items. We then removed 18 teams in which participation
was less than 50% (Kossinets, 2006). Participation rate in each wave was more than 75% for the
included teams. To ensure that nonparticipation did not skew our results, we conducted ANOVA
to compare early and late respondents and found no significant differences for any of the four
KSNE actions, the two predictors, or the control variables. We used late respondents as a proxy
for nonrespondents because KSNE data were not available for nonrespondents.3 The final
analysis included 302 respondents from 97 teams.
Measures
KSNE variables. Individual KS networks were measured using the roster method. At both T1
and T2, we instructed participants as follows: “Please look carefully down the list and place a
check next to the names of people from whom you acquired some new knowledge related to your
class team project,” following prior approaches (e.g. Hansen, 1999). Our approach to
conceptualizing and measuring KS networks is also in line with prior research (e.g., Podolny and
Baron, 1997; Landis, Kilduff, Menges, & Kilduff, 2018).
From the survey data, we created four sociomatrices, one each for the U.S. and Singapore
sections, and one each for T1 and T2, to capture individual-level asymmetric KS network data.
In each matrix, cell Xij represented i’s KS tie to j as indicated by i and was coded as 1 for the

3

Further details of our data cleaning procedures are available on request.
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presence of a tie and 0 otherwise. The data were asymmetric: i could seek knowledge from j, but
j did not necessarily seek knowledge from i (e.g., Hansen, 1999). These four matrices were used
to develop all KS-related measures. Based on the team membership data provided by the
instructor, we split an individual’s ego network into two different sub-networks: within-team ego
network and outside-team ego network. Proximal tie formation captures the number of new
within-team ties that ego had at time T2 that did not exist at T1. Proximal tie decay captures the
number of existing within-team ties that ego had at time T1 that were no longer ties at T2. Distal
tie formation captures the number of new ties that ego had from outside his or her team at T2 but
that did not exist at T1. Distal tie decay captures the number of existing outside-team ties that
ego had at time T1 but that no longer existed at T2. See Figure 1 for an illustration.
Independent variables. Intra-team and inter-team brokerage were measured by counting
the number of structural holes spanned by individuals within their team network and outside their
team network at T1, respectively (Borgatti, Everett, & Johnson, 2013). A structural hole is the
lack of ties between two people who are both ego’s contacts. The number of structural holes an
ego has is the number of pairs of contacts who are not connected to each other. Intra-team
brokerage was thus measured by counting the number of structural holes spanned by an ego in
his or her team by considering only alters within the ego’s team. At the same time, inter-team
brokerage had two parts: first, the number of structural holes spanned with both alters outside the
broker’s team, and second, the structural holes where one alter was inside the broker’s team and
the other alter was outside. It is important to note that the structural holes spanned by an ego that
were solely within his or her team were excluded in the calculation of inter-team brokerage.
Thus, if the ego did not have any alter outside his or her team, his or her inter-team brokerage
would be zero. It is a standard practice in network research to standardize or normalize network
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measures to control for network size differences (Borgatti, 2005; Wasserman & Faust, 1995. We
normalized structural holes’ measures with individuals’ KS network sizes at T1 (Barabási &
Albert, 1999; Price de Solla, 1976) by dividing the two brokerage measures discussed above with
individuals’ total KS outdegree centrality. We used the total KS outdegree of individuals rather
than their intra- and inter-team KS outdegree to normalize because we wanted the two brokerage
measures to be comparable so we could obtain their relative effects on the four KSNE actions.
Control variables: Individual level. We accounted for several alternative explanations
that encompassed individual differences, their knowledge networks, and their friendship
networks. At the individual level, we first accounted for individual differences by controlling for
self-monitoring (one of the most studied network-oriented personalities) with an 18-item scale
(Gangestad & Snyder, 2000). Sasovova et al. (2010) found that over time, a high self-monitor
tends to create and drop friendship ties suggesting that high self-monitors tend to be more active
in changing their networks. One example item of self-monitoring includes the following: “I have
trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.” We used the sum
of true (1) and false (0) values (after reverse coding items appropriately) to represent the extent
of self-monitoring. The composite reliability for this scale was 0.80.
We also controlled for demographic variables, including age, class standing (1 =
sophomore, 2 = freshman, 3 = junior, 4 = senior), gender (1 = male, 0 = female), and race
(Brands & Kilduff, 2014). Among the 302 students, 53.6% were Caucasians, and 38.7% were
Asians. Therefore, we created two dummy variables as control variables: Caucasians (1=
Caucasians, 0 = others) and Asians (1=Asians, 0 = others).
The nature of social networks and their importance to teams is contingent on the tasks
that the team is engaged in (Hansen 1999). Specifically, complex tasks may increase an
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individual’s needs for new information and knowledge in the context of team-based project work
(Maznevski & Chudoba, 2000). Therefore, we controlled for task complexity, measured as an
average score from a widely used five-point Likert-type scale containing eight items (Haerem &
Rau, 2007). One example item was, “To what extent do you feel that your solutions were vague
and difficult to anticipate?” In our study, the composite reliability for this scale was 0.85.
We controlled for KS reciprocity at T1 (because reciprocated ties are stronger ties) to
account for the influence of prior strong ties (Ahuja et al., 2012; Schulte et al., 2012). Prior
research has suggested that strong ties with others come with pressure to retain those ties
(Kleinbaum, 2018). A reciprocated KS tie occurs when both parties in a tie report seeking
knowledge from each other. Reciprocity was calculated as the ratio of reciprocated ties of ego to
his or her total ties in the network.
Further, while friendship ties are affect laden, they provide information (e.g., Balkundi &
Harrison, 2006). Therefore, we need to rule out friendship ties because KS ties can be formed or
decayed by egos depending on their friendship ties. Therefore, we control for out-degree and
betweenness centrality of an ego’s friendship network because they are the two most potent
network positions (Fang et al., 2015). Friendship network was measured at T1 by using the roster
method. We separated the overall friendship network outdegree into intra- and inter-team
friendship outdegree at T1. We calculated the friendship betweenness centrality of each actor
using the formula suggested by Freeman (1978, p. 221). The betweenness of an actor is,
therefore, a measure of the number of times an actor occurs on a geodesic within the friendship
network. Because the formula includes the network size, the raw values for betweenness can be
large when the network is large. All network measures were calculated using UCINET 6. The
definitions and calculations of key network variables are summarized in Table 1.
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---Insert Table 1 here--Control variables: Team level. Because our data were nested in teams, we controlled for
four team-level constructs that accounted for team-level network properties, team transactive
memory, team-level project feedback, and country.
Teams with dense networks may limit the opportunities for individual team members to
change their networks because there are few to no available unconnected members. In contrast,
sparse networks (where only few members seek knowledge from each other) are conducive for
tie formation for intra-team brokers because there are many potential network partners available
(e.g., Obstfeld, 2005). Thus, we controlled for network density (Wasserman & Faust, 1995).
Network change may also be influenced by team emergent states (Schulte et al., 2012).
Prior research has stated that it is important for team members to locate individuals who possess
the required knowledge and then intentionally acquire appropriate knowledge from them (i.e.,
team transactive memory; Lewis, 2004). Even so, a shared understanding among team members
about the expertise within the team may impact the changes that a broker may make. Prior
research has explored this connection between network changes and TMS (Lee, Bachrach, &
Lewis, 2014; Yuan, Fulk, Monge & Contractor, 2010). We controlled for TMS by using a wellestablished scale and collected data at the individual level (Lewis, 2003). The scale was reliable
with a composite reliability value of 0.77. Since there is no appropriate theory to justify the
theoretical distribution of the within-group ratings for TMS, we calculated rwg(j) with three
possible models (James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984; LeBreton & Senter, 2008). The mean rwg(j)
was .79, .81, .89, respectively, for uniform null, slightly skewed, and moderately skewed models.
Rwg(j) ranged between 0.75 to 1 with regard to all three models. Additionally, the F value showed
the between-team difference to be significant (F = 1.31, p = .035). The intraclass correlations for
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this scale were 0.06 for ICC(1) and 0.24 for ICC(2). These analyses thereby provided support for
the aggregation of individual ratings on this scale to the team level.
Research has shown that prior team performance may change how team members relate
to other team members (Mullen & Copper, 1994). Therefore, we controlled for the instructor’s
midterm feedback on team projects given to the teams between time T1 and T2.
Because our sample was from two different countries, we controlled for campus location
because of potential cultural differences between the U.S. and Singapore teams that might cause
differences in individuals’ KS network dynamics. In Singapore, where collectivism is more
prevalent (Hofstede, 1980), individuals may feel more pressure to not drop an existing tie. A
complete listing of items for multi-item variables is provided in Appendix A.
Results
Because individuals in our sample are nested within teams, we used the hierarchical
linear modeling (HLM) procedures suggested by Bryk and Raudenbush (2002) with the HLM
6.0 statistical software. We first checked whether team-level differences existed in the four
KSNE variables using the null model in hierarchical linear models. This analysis yielded
nonsignificant variance of three KSNE variables across teams (χ2 = 88.94, p > .05, ICC = .003
for proximal tie formation; χ2 = 84.71, p > .50, ICC = .001 for proximal tie decay; χ2 = 107.62, p
= .20, ICC = .05 for distal tie formation) but indicated significant differences among teams with
respect to distal tie decay (χ2 = 160.69, p = .00, ICC = .16). To be consistent for all the network
change models, we report the HLM results (e.g., Lau & Liden, 2008).
Table 2 shows the means,4 standard deviations, and correlations for all the variables. In
Table 3, we show the results of HLM analyses for proximal network change actions. In Table 4,
4

It is notable that the mean and standard deviation of friendship betweenness centrality are large (mean = 439.00,
SD = 895.08) because the calculation of betweenness centrality incorporates network size.
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we show the results of HLM analyses for distal network changes. We discuss the results in the
following paragraphs, focusing first on intra-team brokerage and then on inter-team brokerage.
We report both the standard errors (SE) and actual p-values in the table and use an alpha level
of .05 for all statistical tests.
---Insert Tables 2, 3, and 4 here--H1 stated that intra-team brokerage would be negatively associated with proximal KS tie
formation. The results indicated that intra-team brokerage was negatively and significantly
related to proximal tie formation (γ = –.26, p = .00; see Model 2, Table 3). H2 proposed a
positive relationship between intra-team brokerage and proximal tie decay. This hypothesis was
supported because intra-team brokerage was significantly associated with proximal tie decay (γ
= .26, p = .02; see Model 4, Table 3).
H3 and H4 specified the relationship between intra-team brokerage and individuals’ distal
KSNE actions. H3 predicted that intra-team brokerage is negatively associated with distal tie
formation. The results indicated that this hypothesis was not supported (γ = –.09, p = .42; see
Model 6, Table 4). H4 proposed a negative relationship between intra-team brokerage and distal
tie decay. The results indicated that intra-team brokerage was negatively associated with distal tie
decay (γ = –.52, p = .00; see Model 8, Table 4). Therefore, H4 was supported. Thus, regarding
the impact of intra-team brokerage on the four KSNE actions, three hypotheses (H1, H2, and H4)
were supported, and one (H3) was not.
The next set of hypotheses focused on brokerage outside the team. H5 proposed a
positive relationship between inter-team brokerage and proximal tie formation. The results in
Table 3 confirmed this relationship: inter-team brokerage had a positive and significant impact
on proximal tie formation (γ = .02, p = .04; see Model 2, Table 3). H6 posited a negative
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relationship between inter-team brokerage and proximal tie decay. This hypothesis was rejected
(γ = –.03, p = .06; see Model 4, Table 3). Thus, our results partially support the hypotheses
related to the impacts of inter-team brokerage on proximal tie changes.
Hypotheses H7 and H8 proposed a positive association between inter-team brokerage and
distal KSNE actions, respectively. The results do not support H7: inter-team brokerage was not
related to distal tie formation (γ = –.01, p = .52; see Model 6, Table 4). However, the results
indicated that inter-team brokerage was positively associated with distal tie decay (γ = .09, p
= .00; see Model 8, Table 4). Therefore, H8 was supported. Overall, our results supported two of
the four hypotheses related to the impacts of inter-team brokerage on individual KSNE actions
and marginally supported one association.
In summary, we find that intra-team brokers add fewer ties, drop more ties in their teams,
and drop fewer ties outside their teams. The results for intra-team brokers with respect to
forming outside-team ties were not significant. Overall, intra-team brokers seem to prefer
maintaining the status quo. In contrast, inter-team brokers seem to be more active in shaping
their networks. They tend to add more ties inside their teams but are less likely to decay ties
inside their teams and instead will decay ties outside their teams.
Discussion
Theoretical Contributions
The current study extends our understanding of social networks, particularly that of social
network evolution, as we highlight the importance of team boundaries in shaping social
networks. Salancik (1995) raised the question about where ties come from. We sought to answer
this question along with exploring how ties decay in the context of team boundaries because both
these changes can occur both inside as well as outside an individual’s team. After taking a host of
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alternative explanations into account, such as personality, task complexity, strength of ties, and
even team-level effects, we find that individuals shape their networks based on their brokerage
positions inside and outside their team.
Our paper also improves our understanding of brokers and the direction of flow of
information during brokerage. Recently, Li, Li, Guo, Li and Harris (in press) have made a case
for why giving advice (unlike seeking advice or KS) may include informational benefits for the
advice-giving broker. However, many of these benefits depend on how the receivers of
knowledge use that information. We focus on the primary receiver of information—the one who
actively seeks out knowledge from his or her connections. For such brokers, the benefits of
seeking out knowledge are direct and immediate, and the action is more in line with the actual
mechanisms that Burt (1992) and others have proposed. By seeking out knowledge from
different sources, brokers are able to combine the information to make more unconventional
decisions (and thus be creative). They can also act as intermediaries in deciding what information
to convey to their contacts and whether to even mention their contacts to each other. This would
be the first step in deciding whether brokers want to get their contacts directly connected or keep
them apart. Underlying the structural holes theory is the key assumption that brokers seek out
information rather than being mere providers of it. That is, the dominant assumption and
measurement of brokerage in instrumental ties such as advice tend to be outgoing ties with
inflowing information. We emphasize this so that future research can build on the direction of
ties and their role in arbitrage.
Further, our findings about the two types of brokerage contribute to the debate on the
contexts in which structural holes are a disadvantage. Although researchers have overwhelmingly
focused on the benefits of structural holes, they have identified two brokerage situations that can
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limit brokers: having strong ties and being in collective cultures (Krackhardt, 1998, Xiao & Tsui,
2007). We add a new boundary condition for structural holes by proposing that when individuals
work in team settings, they are observed by other team members, especially if they are brokers.
Team membership reduces opportunistic behaviors of individual members, particularly intrateam brokers. Our results show that compared to other team members, brokers refrain from their
usual behaviors and are less willing to add ties to unconnected alters within their teams.
However, other members in less advantageous positions, that is, low in intra-team brokerage, are
not constrained in their networking behavior inside their teams. That is, the team context serves
as a boundary condition for the potency of brokerage.
Limitations and Future Research Directions
One of the limitations of the current study is that we do not directly measure mediating
variables such as information exchanged, monitoring, and autonomy. Even though this is a
common problem with network papers (e.g., Balkundi & Harrison, 2006), future research needs
to unpack the mechanisms through which brokers use the information they receive from their
alters to shape their networks. More fine-grained approaches such as grounded theory may be
more appropriate in specifying these rich mechanisms and the deep interplay between structure
and agency (e.g., Li et al., in press).
We used multi-wave research design with data from individuals nested in teams. We also
tested for various boundary conditions and alternative explanations at the individual and team
level, including the team’s network structure and emergent state (team transactive memory).
However, other personal factors that can potentially influence networks, such as the broker’s
general mental ability and prosocial motivation, need to be explored in the future.
The participants of this study can be seen as “temporary workers” because these students
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probably never worked together before and are not likely to be in the same work team again after
the class ends. Therefore, the students may have acted in more instrumental ways because they
knew that this overall network was temporary and that the changes they made were short-lived.
Further research could analyze whether our findings still hold in situations where workers have
known each other for a while and are expected to be in the organization for an extended period of
time. Future research could also consider if there is a difference between the tie decay we
observed in these temporary teams and the more long-term ties that become dormant over several
years (e.g., Levin, Walter, & Murnighan, 2011). Regardless of the temporary or permanent nature
of these teams, as long as performance orientation and interdependence remain the same in other
contexts, we expect our findings to be externally valid. However, future research needs to
explore whether our findings would hold where monitoring is uniformly high. For example, the
level of monitoring in manufacturing teams tends to be quite high (e.g., Barker, 1993). Future
research needs to explore how monitoring not just through informal relationships but also
through electronic surveillance and other unobtrusive approaches changes social structures and
affects intra-team brokerage accordingly.
We proposed eight hypotheses and found support for five of them. The hypotheses that
were not supported involved distal tie formation as the dependent variable and the two types of
brokerage—intra-team and inter-team brokerage—as predictors, respectively. It could be
possible that both types of brokers find that the cost benefit equation does not yield net benefits
to them when forming new KS ties with people to seek useful and unique information. The
benefits of connecting with external sources of information are clear for both types of brokers
because external alters who are not connected with the existing alters of the broker provide
unique information that may be useful to both types of brokers in their team projects. However,
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there are two costs associated with forming new KS ties outside the team. First, brokers need to
identify those people outside their teams who are not connected (or are less connected) with the
existing alters of the broker to be able to receive unique and useful information from them.
Second, both types of brokers face the additional cognitive burden of processing and integrating
new information that comes from outside the team with information they have gained from
within their teams. The sum of these costs may cancel out or even outweigh the benefits to the
brokers from the new, unique, and useful information they stand to gain from the new external
alters. Future research needs to explore these potential costs and benefits to better understand
how and when both types of brokers form new ties outside their teams.
Managerial Implications
Given the fast pace of knowledge generation and change in the knowledge society,
individuals who fail to continually evaluate the value of their present and potential knowledge
ties or fail to use that information to change their KS networks may fall behind others who are
actively engaged in the learning and action cycle. The results of this study clearly provide
evidence that individuals’ KS network ties evolve both within and outside their team boundaries.
Hence, individuals should change their KS ties depending on their dynamically changing
knowledge needs and as they learn about the value of knowledge from their existing ties and
nonconnected others. In this dynamic process, brokerage strongly predicts KSNE actions, and
brokerage location impacts individual KSNE actions. Therefore, managers who want to
encourage team members to seek knowledge and gain the benefits of enhanced knowledge from
different contacts should help individuals identify their own brokerage position. Further, teams
need to seek out members who may be peripheral inside the team but are in advantageous
positions elsewhere. These identified outside-team brokers then need to be seen as resources that
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can potentially help the team and other members in it.
Typical team building exercises focus on activities within the team to help develop
cohesion (Cummings & Worley, 2014). The findings of this study have important implications for
managers that seek ways to improve their team’s chemistry. Too much emphasis on the team may
make members more isolated from the workplace while making them watchful of each other. Not
only would this make individuals more disenchanted with their own teams, but it would also
distance them from the rest of the organization. Therefore, the implication of this study is that
managers need to seek out requisite variety in their team members’ networks so that they have an
optimal number of ties inside and outside their teams.
Conclusion
We extend social network literature by providing a finer-grained analysis of network
evolution in team contexts by partitioning network changes into four distinct elemental types. We
tested how prior networks in terms of intra- and inter-team brokerage drive network change. We
thus add new insights into the differential impacts of intra-team and inter-team brokerage to the
literature on social network evolution. Overall, the findings of this study suggest that even
individuals in powerful network positions are contained by their contexts.
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Figure 1. The conceptualization of individual KSNE actions.
Note. Each node represents a person. The blank nodes represent persons in the same team with
the ego node. The gray nodes represent persons who are outside the team. The dashed circle
indicates the team boundary. Directed ties from the ego to the nodes imply that the ego person
sought knowledge from the nodes.
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Table 1
Definitions of The Key Network Variables
Variable
Proximal tie formation

Definition
Within–team ties that were formed
between T1 and T2.
Within–team ties that decayed between T1
and T2.

Calculation
The number of new within–team ego network ties that were formed between
time T1 and T2.
The number of existing within–team ego network ties that were decayed
between time T1 and T2.

Distal tie formation

Between–team ties that were formed
between T1 and T2.

The number of outside-team ego network ties that were formed between time
T1 and T2.

Distal tie decay

Between–team ties that decayed between
T1 and T2.

The number of existing outside–team ego network ties that were decayed
between time T1 and T2.

Overall brokerage

The degree to which an ego connects
otherwise unconnected alters.

Intra–team brokerage

The degree to which an ego connects
otherwise unconnected alters inside his or
her team.
The degree to which an ego connects
otherwise unconnected alters outside his
or her team, at least one of whom is
outside the ego’s team.

The number of structural holes spanned by an ego. A structural hole is the lack
of a tie between two persons who are both contacts of the ego. Hence, the
number of structural holes an ego has is the number of pairs of contacts who
are not connected to each other.
The number of structural holes spanned by an ego inside his or her team
considering only alters within the ego’s team.

Proximal tie decay

Inter–team brokerage

Outdegree centrality
Betweenness centrality
Total network churn volume

The degree to which the ego is connected
with others in the network.
The degree to which the ego is able to
control others.

Number of structural holes spanned by an ego outside his or her team
considering at least one alter outside the ego’s team. It is calculated by
subtracting the number of structural holes spanned by the ego that lie solely
within the team boundary from the total number of structural holes spanned by
the ego in his or her entire network both inside and outside the team.
The total number of outgoing ties reported by the ego.
How often the ego lies along the shortest path between two other actors.

The degree to which the ego’s current ego The sum of: a) number of new ties formed by the ego between T1 and T2; and
network is different from his or her
b) number of existing ties decayed by the ego between T1 and T2.
previous ego network.
Note. In our analyses, we used the normalized intra and inter-brokerage that control for the influence of the total KS outdegree at T1. Normalized brokerage = raw
brokerage measure at T1/total KS outdegree at T1.
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Table 2
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Between the Variables
Variable

M

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

Individual/Level–1 (N = 302)
1

Gender

2

Age

0.49

0.50

—

21.08

2.48

–.03

—

3
4

Caucasian

0.54

0.50

–.13

–.07

Asian

0.39

0.49

.17

.11

–.87

5

Class standing

3.11

0.64

–.01

.32

.13

–.14

—

6

Self-monitoring

9.62

3.12

–.18

–.10

.08

–.07

–.06

(.80)

7

Task complexity

2.06

0.54

–.05

–.06

–.17

.21

–.07

.01

(.85)

8

KS reciprocity

0.40

0.29

.12

–.07

.02

.03

.04

–.07

–.12

9

Friendship intra-team outdegree

0.53

1.01

.19

–.15

–.35

.36

–.24

.06

.08

.14

10

Friendship inter-team outdegree

2.31

3.33

–.01

–.09

–.31

.30

–.22

.14

.09

.04

439.00 895.08

—
—

—
—
.16

—

11

Friendship betweenness

–.02

–.08

.02

–.05

–.07

.12

.03

–.00

.01

.36

12

Intra-team brokerage

0.94

0.88

–.05

.02

.13

–.17

.02

–.02

–.17

.05

–.05

–.14

13

Inter-team brokerage

5.43

6.36

.06

.03

–.21

.26

–.15

–.04

.15

–.04

.13

14

Proximal tie formation

0.37

0.83

.00

.20

.08

–.06

.06

–.10

.14

–.13

.01

15

Proximal tie decay

1.09

1.37

–.02

–.05

–.05

–.03

–.07

.09

–.05

.04

–.10

16

Distal tie formation

0.87

1.46

–.06

–.05

–.05

.05

–.19

.10

.05

.02

17

Distal tie decay

0.86

1.92

.04

.02

–.21

.26

.06

–.05

.12

–.27

—
.01

—

.30

.27

–.07

–.05

–.07

–.15

.12

–.02

.11

.21

–.11

–.26

.02

.40

.25

–.02

.14

–.01

.09

.07

.20

.10

–.31

.41

.11

–.09

—
—
—
—
–.03

—

Team/Level–2 (N = 97)
18

KS team density

0.53

0.20

—

19

Transactive memory system

3.57

0.35

20

Midterm feedback

4.41

0.96

.11

.03

21

Campus location

.80

0.40

–.20

–.13

.08

(.77)
—
–.09

Note. Composite reliability estimates are in parentheses on the diagonal. Correlations between individual-level variables are significant at the .01 level when their absolute values > |.18| and significant at the .05 level when their
absolute values > |.11|. Correlations between team-level variables are significant at the .05 level when their absolute values > |.19|. Two-tailed test.
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Table 3
HLM Results for the Effects of Brokerage on Proximal Tie Change Actions
Proximal Tie Formation
M1

Proximal Tie Decay

M2

M3

M4

γ

SE

P

γ

SE

P

γ

SE

P

γ

SE

P

.51

.23

.03

.60

.23

.01

1.47

.39

.00

1.34

.40

.00

–.01

.10

.91

–.04

.09

.69

.02

.16

.91

.05

.16

.76

Age

.09

.03

.00

.09

.03

.00

–.02

.04

.63

–.01

.04

.74

Caucasian

.27

.19

.15

.27

.18

.14

–1.01

.32

.00

–.98

.32

.00

Asian

–.03

.20

.89

–.10

.20

.61

–.71

.34

.04

–.59

.34

.09

Class standing

–.01

.11

.94

.03

.10

.78

–.08

.18

.68

–.12

.18

.49

Self-monitoring

–.05

.02

.01

–.04

.02

.02

.08

.03

.02

.07

.03

.03

Task complexity

.18

.10

.08

.12

.10

.23

–.08

.18

.67

–.01

.18

.98

–.30

.24

.20

–.12

.23

.63

.49

.40

.23

.30

.41

.46

Friend intra-team outdegree

.05

.08

.48

.09

.07

.24

–.17

.13

.18

–.21

.13

.10

Friend inter-team outdegree

.02

.02

.37

.01

.02

.73

–.06

.03

.07

–.05

.04

.17

–.00

.00

.09

–.00

.00

.05

.00

.00

.02

.00

.00

.01

KS team density

–.82

.25

.00

–.82

.24

.00

.57

.42

.18

.57

.42

.17

Transactive memory system

–.36

.14

.01

–.37

.13

.01

.05

.23

.83

.07

.23

.78

.04

.05

.41

.04

.05

.44

.13

.09

.14

.14

.09

.13

–.30

.15

.05

–.36

.15

.02

.48

.26

.06

.56

.26

.03

Intra-team brokerage

–.26

.06

.00

.26

.11

.02

Inter-team brokerage

.02

.01

.04

–.03

.02

.06

Intercept
Level 1 Controls
Gender

KS reciprocity

Friend betweenness
Level 2 Controls

Midterm feedback
Campus location
Level 1Predictors

X2
Deviance

79.01

84.18

81.34

83.51

760.25

750.42

1066.37

1065.62

Note: Unstandardized estimates are reported. Two-tailed test. Individual n = 302; Team n = 97.
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Table 4
HLM Results for the Effects of Brokerage on Distal Tie Change Actions
Distal Tie Formation
M5

γ

SE

1.41

.41

–.25

Age
Caucasian

Distal Tie Decay
M6

γ

SE

P

γ

.00

1.36

.42

.00

–.07

.17

.14

–.25

.17

.14

.04

.04

.33

.04

.04

.07

.32

.83

.11

Asian

–.04

.34

.91

Class standing

–.34

.18

Self–monitoring

–.00

Task complexity
KS reciprocity

SE

M8
P

γ

.54

.89

.52

.52

.32

.12

.22

.58

.02

.20

.91

.31

–.09

.05

.11

–.10

.05

.03

.32

.74

.41

.42

.32

.23

.38

.56

.01

.35

.98

1.41

.45

.00

.88

.42

.04

.05

–.35

.18

.05

.11

.23

.62

.25

.20

.23

.03

.91

–.01

.03

.85

–.03

.04

.47

–.01

.04

.78

.06

.17

.71

.07

.18

.71

–.18

.22

.42

–.36

.20

.08

.28

.39

.48

.35

.40

.38

–1.97

.51

.00

–1.60

.46

.00

Friend intra-team outdegree

–.13

.13

.32

–.12

.13

.35

.02

.16

.91

.10

.15

.49

Friend inter-team outdegree

.16

.03

.00

.16

.04

.00

.09

.04

.05

.04

.04

.28

Friend betweenness

.00

.00

.06

.00

.00

.05

.00

.00

.76

–.00

.00

.73

KS team density

–.17

.48

.73

–.17

.48

.73

–1.34

.65

.04

–1.30

.67

.05

Transactive memory system

–.11

.27

.68

–.11

.27

.69

.04

.36

.90

–.04

.38

.92

.05

.10

.62

.05

.10

.61

–.29

.14

.03

–.34

.14

.02

–.53

.28

.07

–.52

.29

.07

.15

.38

.70

–.15

.38

.69

Intra-team brokerage

–.09

.11

.42

–.52

.13

.00

Inter-team brokerage

–.01

.02

.52

.09

.02

.00

Intercept

P

M7

SE

P

Level 1 Controls
Gender

Level 2 Controls

Midterm feedback
Campus location
Level 1Predictors

X2
Deviance

126.77*
1080.63

126.34*
1088.68

148.19**

191.51**

1231.73

1200.27

Note: Unstandardized estimates are reported. Two-tailed test. Individual n = 302; Team n = 97.
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Appendix A
Self-Monitoring (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000)
Instructions: Please circle either T (true) or F (false) to indicate whether the following statements
are descriptive of you in general.
1.
2.
3.
4.

I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people.
At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like.
I can only argue for ideas which I already believe.
I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no
information. (Reversed)
5. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others. (Reversed)
6. I would probably make a good actor. (Reversed)
7. In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention.
8. In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons.
(Reversed)
9. I am not particularly good at making other people like me.
10. I’m not always the person I appear to be. (Reversed)
11. I would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please someone or
win their favor.
12. I have considered being an entertainer. (Reversed)
13. I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.
14. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.
15. At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going.
16. I feel a bit awkward in public and do not show up quite as well as I should.
17. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end).
(Reversed)
18. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them. (Reversed)
Task Complexity (Haerem & Rau, 2007)
Introduction: Based on your perception of project task characteristics, please indicate the extent
to which each of these items applies to the given tasks. (1-very little extent, 5-very great extent)
1. To what extent do the requirements reflect structured tasks? (Reversed)
2. To what extent do you feel that the requirements can be solved by use of a certain
method? (Reversed)
3. To what extent do you feel that there are fundamental similarities between the responses
to these requirements? (Reversed)
4. To what extent do you feel that you have a mental picture to guide you in responding to
the above requirements? (Reversed)
5. To what extent did you come across problems about which you were unsure while
responding to these requirements? (Reversed)
6. To what extent did you come up against unexpected factors in responding to the above
requirements?
7. To what extent do you feel that your solutions were vague and difficult to anticipate?
3
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8. To what extent do you feel that it is difficult to identify a solution to the requirements?
Transactive Memory System (Lewis, 2003)
Introduction: Each of the statements below is something that a person might say about his or her
work doing the project. Please indicate your own personal feelings about that work by marking
how much you agree with each of the statements. (1-strongly disagree, 5-strongly agree)
1.
2.
3.
4.

Each team member has specialized knowledge of some aspect of our project.
I have knowledge about an aspect of the project that no other team member has.
Different team members are responsible for expertise in different areas.
The specialized knowledge of several different team members was needed to complete
the project deliverables.
5. I know which team members have expertise in specific areas.
6. I was comfortable accepting procedural suggestions from other team members.
7. I trusted that other members’ knowledge about the project was credible.
8. I was confident relying on the information that other team members brought to the
discussion.
9. When other members gave information, I wanted to double-check it for myself.
10. I did not have much faith in other members’ “expertise”.
11. Our team worked together in a well-coordinated fashion.
12. Our team had very few misunderstandings about what to do.
13. Our team needed to backtrack and start over a lot.
14. We accomplished the task smoothly and efficiently.
15. There was much confusion about how we would accomplish the task.
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